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Product Boundary, vertical Competition, and the 
double Mark-up problem 
 
Leonard K.Cheng* 
and  
Jae Nahm** 
 
 
We develop a model in which a main product (called product A) provides a performance quality z 
by itself, whereas a complementary  product  (called product B) is useless by itself but enhances 
the main product’s performance quality to q >z. This asymmetric complementarity gives rise to 
the following results. First, if z is relatively small, then firms A and B behave as if the products 
are symmetrically complementary with the usual double marginalization problem. Second, if z is 
sufficiently large, then firms A and B price their products as if they are independent. Third, over 
a certain range of intermediate z, no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.  
 
1.  Introduction 
In the computing industry, since 1990 there has been no single dominant vertically 
integrated firm. Instead, the industry is characterized by vertical disintegration i.e., computer 
systems or platforms consist of many vertically related layers of components. Firms in different 
layers rely on one another, but at the same time they compete against each other for a bigger 
share of the industry profits.  It is important to understand complementarity among different 
components.  
In 1838, Cournot analysed the pricing of symmetrically complementary products, like left 
and right shoes, and identified the well known “double mark-up problem,” i.e., when the two 
complementary products are supplied by two independent monopolies, the prices are higher than 
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those set by an integrated monopoly. However, the complementarity relationship in the 
computing industry is quite different from that analysed by Cournot and others. For instance, an 
advanced application program enhances the value of an operating system (O/S), but it is useless 
without the O/S. In contrast, the O/S provides its basic functions without the advanced 
application program.   
Furthermore, as Bresnahan (1999) and Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) point out, in 
order to obtain a larger share of industry profits, a firm producing one product has an incentive to 
enter the others’ “turf” by incorporating functions provided by the other firms. For example, in its 
early days, MS Windows did not include program functions such as WordPad, Internet Explorer 
(I.E.), and Windows Media, but over time it has included these and other programs that were 
previously supplied by independent firms. Another example is secondary cache. Once a separate 
piece of hardware, secondary cache is now integrated into the Intel CPU. As firms constantly try 
to expand their product boundaries, the boundaries between adjacent layers and the relationships 
among those products change continuously as a consequence of both vertical competition and 
technological innovation.  
This paper analyses the strategic interactions between two firms whose products are 
asymmetrically complementary and attempts to shed light on vertical competition among 
different layers of the computing industry by exploring the effects of changes in their product 
boundaries.  
To model asymmetric complementarity, we assume that the “main product” A, produced 
by firm A, by itself provides a performance quality of z, but consumers may derive a higher 
performance quality of q ( i.e.,  q > z ) by combining it with an “enhancer” product B, produced 
independently by firm B. Unlike the main product A, product B does not provide any function by 
itself.  
To explore the implications of asymmetric complementarities between products A and B, 
we first analyse a simultaneous pricing game between firms A and B given z, 0< z <q. It turns out 
that asymmetric complementarity combined with heterogeneous consumer preference over 
performance gives rise to the following three unexpected results. First, if z is relatively small, 
then products A and B are as if they are symmetrically complementary with z = 0 and are always 
sold as a bundle. Second, if z is sufficiently large, then firms A and B price their products as if 
they are independent, in which case some consumers buy A alone while others buy both products. 
This result has an implication on the “double mark-up” problem:  Even though products A and B 
are asymmetrically complementary, the firms set their prices independently, and the “double 
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mark-up” problem vanishes. Third, over a certain range of intermediate value z, no pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium exists. However, we can construct a mixed strategy equilibrium over the range. 
Also, we examine the effects of increasing z, which can be interpreted as an expansion of 
firm A’s product boundary. We analyse how an increase in z affects social welfare, industry 
profits and consumer welfare.  
There are several recent related studies on complementary technologies and patents (e.g., 
Farrell and Katz 2000 and Lerner and Tirole 2002) and tying/bundling (e.g., Whinston (1990), 
Choi and Stefanadis (2001), Carlton and Waldman (2002), and Nalebuff (2004)).  
 Farrell and Katz (2000) analyze the incentive of a monopolist in product A to enter 
complementary product B’s market in order to force independent suppliers of B to charge lower 
prices, which increases its own profits made from product A. If consumers in our model were 
homogeneous, then our results would become very similar to those of Farrell and Katz (2000): an 
increase in z "price squeezes" product B and always has a positive effects on firm A’s profits.  
With heterogeneous consumer preference, however, we show that an increase in z does not have 
monotonic effects on firms’ pricing and profits.  
Our model is also closely related to Lerner and Tirole (2004)’s model of patent portfolios, 
which allows a full range of complementarity and substitutability. There are several major 
differences between our model and theirs. First, their focus is on factors that encourage or hinder 
the formation of patent pools and the welfare effect of these pools, whereas our focus is on the 
firms’ switching pricing behavior and the welfare effects of changes in z. Second, in their model 
all users or licensees derive the same amount of marginal benefits from an additional patent, but 
in our model different consumer types derive different marginal benefits from the basic product A 
and the bundle (A+B). Because of these differences, we obtain the result that the demand for A 
and B is independent of each other if z is sufficiently large and that no pure-strategy equilibrium 
exists for intermediate values of z. 
Our paper is related to the literature on tying/bundling because product A in our model 
can be regarded as a bundle of two complementary products, A1 and B1 ( i.e., A1 and B1 combine 
to yield a performance quality z, whereas A1 and B combine to yield a performance quality q.) 
However, this literature either focuses on the entry deterrence role of tying or assumes that tying 
with a firm’s own product excludes consumption of competing products. 1  However, when 
                                                          
1 In the literature on tying, if an incumbent ties its products, it is often assumed that consumers 
cannot untie the tied product, or consumers do not have any incentive to add an entrant’s product 
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Microsoft ties its Windows O/S and its applications such as I.E., it still leaves room for 
consumers to add a rival product to its OS. We capture this product relationship by assuming that 
product B as an enhancer of the basic product A. 
Nalebuff (2004) shows that when consumers are heterogenous in their valuations of 
products A and B, an incumbent, by bundling A and B, can significantly lower the profits of a 
single-product entrant and that bundling could be quite an effective entry deterrence strategy.2 
However, our paper looks at the case in which one firm produces only a base product, and the 
other firm produces a complementary product. 
Section 2 develops a simple model, and section 3 analyzes the game and demonstrates the 
possible non-existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Section 4 analyzes the effect of z on 
firms’ profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare.  In section 5, we check the robustness of the 
main results when consumers’ preferences vary along two dimensions. Concluding remarks 
follow in the final section.  
2.  A Model of product boundary 
There are two firms, A and B, that provide complementary products A and B, 
respectively. Product A provides some basic functions, and its performance level is measured by 
a parameter z.  Product B by itself does not provide any function, but enhances product A’s 
performance.  The combination of products A and B (denoted by (A+B) hereafter) provides a 
higher performance level q ≥ z. Let product i’s (i=A, B) price and unit production cost be denoted 
by pi and ci, respectively.  We assume that the two firms set their prices simultaneously.  
Given pA and pB, consumers make their purchase decisions. Consumers differ in their 
valuation of product quality.  The utility function of a type-θ consumer, θ∈ [0,1],  is given by 
θQ+I, where I is her income spent on numeraire goods, and Q is a quality index of a 
product.  Let the cumulative distribution function and continuous density functions be 
given by G(θ) and g(θ), respectively. Define F(θ) as the proportion of consumers whose type is 
higher than θ and f(θ) as F’s density function, i.e., F(θ)=1-G(θ), and f(θ)= -g(θ)<0.  We make the 
standard assumption that the distribution of θ satisfies the increasing hazard rate condition: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to the tied products because there is no quality difference between the incumbent and the 
entrant’s products.  
2 Interestingly, the bundling decision increases the incumbent’s profit even after entry occurs in 
one of these markets. In Whinston (1990), and Choi and Stefanadis (2001), tying is not a 
profitable choice for an incumbent if entry has already occurred.  
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namely, -f(θ)/F(θ) is increasing in θ.3  This increasing hazard rate condition yields strictly quasi-
concave profit functions for firms A and B. 
We impose the following restrictions on the model’s key parameters throughout our 
analysis, 
 
Assumption 1: cA + cB ≤ q   
  0≤ z ≤ z  = q - cB   
  
The first restriction implies that the maximum willingness to pay for product (A+B) is larger than 
or equal to its unit production cost.  Without this restriction, (A+B) will never be supplied.  The 
second restriction implies that the quality enhancement brought about by product B (i.e., q-z) is 
larger than or equal to cB.  Without the second restriction, there will be no supply of product B. 
Under Assumption 1, both firms A and B are active and the classic double mark-up problem may 
arise.   
 
Demand functions for products A and B 
Consumer θ has three options: (i) to buy product A alone and gain net utility VA (θ) = zθ-
pA; (ii) to buy (A+B) and gain net utility VA+B (θ) = qθ-pA - pB ; (iii) and to buy neither and gain 
zero net utility.  A necessary condition for the consumer to buy A alone is θ ≥ θA  = pA/z.  
Similarly, a necessary condition for a consumer to buy (A+B) is θ ≥ θA+B  = (pA+ pB)/ q.   
Consumers get additional benefits of (q-z) θ by purchasing product B in addition to product A.  
Thus, a necessary condition for a consumer to buy B in addition to A is that θ ≥ θB= pB/(q-z).   
Since VA(θ) intersects the steeper function VA+B(θ) at one point, θB, there are three 
possible cases. 
 
Case 1.  Virtually Independent Products: θA < θA+B < θB.   
 
This case is illustrated in Figure 1. Consumer types between θA and θB will buy product 
A alone, whereas consumer types θ ≥ θB will buy (A+B).   That is, consumers with θ ≥ θA will 
                                                          
3 The increasing hazard rate condition is satisfied by most widely used distributions. See 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). 
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buy product A, and consumers with θ ≥ θB will additionally buy product B.  Substituting the 
definition of θA and θB, the demand functions for A and B become: 
    
DA(pA,pB) =  F(θA)  =   F( zp A )                            (1) 
 
DB(pA,pB)=   F(θB) =   F( zqpB− )     
 
As long as their prices satisfy θA < θA+B < θB, the demand for A depends only on pA, and 
the demand for B depends only on pB. Firms A and B act as independent firms, and we call this 
case “virtually independent products” and refer to the firms’ pricing as “independent pricing” in 
the rest of this paper. Let *1Ap  and 
*
1Bp  denote the Nash Equilibrium prices under independent 
pricing. For example, when F(θ)=1-θ  (i.e., θ is uniformly distributed), the Nash equilibrium 
prices are 2
Acz+  and 2 B
q z c− + , respectively.  
 
Case 2:  Virtually Strict Complements: θB < θA+B < θA   
Figure 2 illustrates this case.  Consumers with θ < θA+B will buy neither products, but 
consumers with θ ≥ θA+B will buy (A+B).  None will buy product A alone. Substituting the 
definition of θA+B, the demand functions for A and B become: 
 
DA(pA,pB) = DB(pA,pB) =  )( q
pp BAF +   (2) 
 
As long as θB < θA+B < θA, the demand for A and that for B depend on the total price (pA+ pB), 
exhibiting the characteristics of strict complements. Thus, in the rest of this paper we call this 
case “virtually strict complements” and refer to the firms’ pricing of the virtually strict 
complements as “bundling pricing.” Let RA( pB) and RB( pA) denote the firms’ best response 
functions when the two faces demand system (2). We assume that '
'1
A
BR
R>  so that there is a 
unique interaction of the two best response functions. The Nash equilibrium is denoted by ( * 2Ap  
and * 2Bp ). For example, when F(θ)=1-θ, we have RA( pB)= 2B Aq p c− + , RB( pA)= 2A Bq p c− + , and the 
Nash equilibrium is ( 23B A
q c c− + ,  23A B
q c c− + ).  
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Case 3:  Borderline between Virtually Strict Complements and Independent Products: θB 
= θA+B = θA 
  
Starting from this borderline case, the firms face demand system (1) either if firm A 
lowers its price or if firm B increases its price, however slightly. And they face demand system 
(2) either if firm A increases its price or if firm B lowers its price. In other words, the firms’ 
demand functions meet at a kink where θB = θA+B = θA.  Lemma 2 in Section 3 says that the case 
θB = θA+B = θA cannot be a Nash equilibrium. An immediate implication is that if a pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium exists, then the realized demand system must be either (1) or (2). Therefore 
( *1Ap  and 
*
1Bp ) and (
*
2Ap  and 
*
2Bp ) are the only candidates for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.   
 
3.  Analysis 
 
Firm B’s optimal pricing 
 
We first examine firm B’s optimal price given pA.  The demand function faced by firm B 
depends on the relative size of θB and θA. 
   
  DB1 = F( zq
p B− )  if  pB  ≥ Az zq p−    
DB(pA,pB ) =           
  DB2 = )( q
pp BAF +  if  pB  ≤ Az zq p−  
 
Let us define the profit functions corresponding to DB1 and DB2 as ΠB1(pB; z)  = F( zqp B− )(pB – cB) 
and  ΠB2(pB; pA) = )( q pp BAF + (pB – cB), respectively. Firm B maximizes ΠB1(pB; z) subject to the 
constraint pB  ≥ Az zq p−  and ΠB2(pB; pA) subject to the constraint pB  ≤ Az zq p− .  The two profit 
functions intersect at pB  = Az
zq p− .4 Let *1Bp  and RB(pA) denote the unconstrained optimal prices 
of ΠB1 and ΠB2, respectively. Lemma 1 shows that firm B’s overall profit function has a single 
peak for any given pA and that its optimal price is unique.  
 
                                                          
4 When pB  = Az
zq p− , we have q
pp BA +
 = 1q (
z
q z− pB+pB)= 
1
q z−  pB. 
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Lemma 1: Firm B’s optimal price depends on pA and is continuous in pA.  There exist Ap  and 
Ap , where 0 < Ap < Ap < q-cB , such that  
              *1Bp               if  pA ≤ Ap   
      *Bp   =   Az
zq p−    if 
A
p  ≤ pA ≤ Ap  
   RB (pA)   if Ap ≤ pA ≤ q - cB. 5 
   
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 
If pA is zero, then clearly all consumers will get product A, and the only question is who 
will buy product B additionally.  From the point of view of firm B, it faces demand system (1) 
and maximizes its profit along DB1 by setting its optimal price, *1Bp , or equivalently by selling its 
products to consumers whose types are above the cut-off point *Bθ = *1Bp /(q-z).  As pA increases, 
fewer consumers will buy product A, but as long as the lowest consumer type that buys product A 
is lower than *1Bp /(q-z), firm B’s optimal price remains unconstrained by pA.   
However, once pA exceeds the threshold Ap   but remains below Ap , then the constraint 
becomes just binding, so firm B’s optimal price occurs at the kink Az
zq p− .   
If pA is higher than Ap , then no consumer is interested in buying product A alone, and 
products A and B are always sold together as a bundle, so B’s optimal price becomes RB (pA).  
Figure 3 illustrates how firm B’s optimal price responds to pA in the case of a uniform 
distribution.6  As the figure shows, firm B’s best response is not monotonic.  
 
Firm A’s optimal pricing 
 
Similar to firm B’s case, firm A’s demand curve consists of two connected segments DA1 
and DA2. When pB is taken as given, firm A maximizes ΠA1 = F( zp A )(pA-cA) subject to pA ≤ zq z− pB, 
but maximizes ΠA2 = F( q pp BA + ) (pA-cA) subject to pA  ≥ zq z− pB. Let *1Ap  and RA(pB) denote the 
                                                          
5 If pA> q-cB, then *Bp = cB, and none will buy product B. 
6 In this case, 
A
p = 
)(2
)(
zq
czqz B
−
+− , Ap = 
zq
cqz B
−
+
2
)( , *1Bp  =
2
Bczq +− , and RB(pA)  = 
2
BA cpq +− . 
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unconstrained optimal pA for the profit functions, ΠA1 and ΠA2, respectively. The following 
lemma describes firm A’s optimal price. 
 
Lemma 2  There exist Bp% such that if pB  ≤ Bp% , then firm A sets its price equal to RA(pB), and we 
have θA* > θB*; if  pB ≥ Bp% , firm A sets its price at *1Ap , and we have θA* < θB*. Also, since 
RA( Bp% ) > *1Ap , firm A’s optimal price is not continuous in pB  at pB = Bp% .  
 
Proof. See the Appendix.  
 
While products A and B are asymmetric complements, products A and (A+B) are 
substitutes for each other. Firm A chooses between two different pricing strategies: “independent 
pricing” (i.e., selling product A as a stand-alone product) or “bundling pricing” (i.e., selling it as a 
part of the bundle (A+B)). That is, firm A can sell its product as a stand-alone low-quality 
product or can sell it as a component of a high-quality product. If pB is sufficiently low, then firm 
A will find it profitable to choose bundling pricing. In contrast, if pB is relatively high, then the 
demand for (A+B) is limited by the high price of product B, so firm A may find it more profitable 
to choose independent pricing. 
These considerations behind firm A’s optimal pricing strategies are quite similar to those 
discovered by Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003).7 In Gabszewicz and Wauthy’s model, there are 
two firms supplying vertically differentiated stand-alone products, but consumers also have an 
option of “joint purchase” of both products. They analyse how the joint purchase affects price 
competition between duopolists under the assumption of uniform distribution and zero production 
costs. They find that “a firm faces two different pricing strategies: either it charges relatively low 
prices and fights for market shares or it “retreats” with high price on the “rich” side of the market 
where “joint purchasers” are located.”  
 
Nash equilibrium  
 
                                                          
7 In Gabszewicz and Wauthy’s model, products have their own stand-alone values. However, in 
our model product B is useless by itself. Given this difference, in our model we have an 
equilibrium in which the two firms behave as independent firms. Such an equilibrium cannot 
arise in Gabszewicz and Wauthy’s model. 
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Lemma 2 has an implication for finding Nash equilibria. If pB is lower than Bp% , then firm 
A sets its price equal to RA(pB), which is strictly larger than zq z− pB , and we have θA* > θB*; If  pB  
is higher than Bp% , firm A sets its price equal to *1Ap , which is strictly less than zq z− pB , and we 
have θA* < θB*. So the lemma implies that θA* = θB* cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, if a 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, then in equilibrium either both firms adopt independent 
pricing (θA < θB ) or both firms adopt bundling pricing (θB < θA). From this result Corollary 1 
follows.  
 
Corollary 1. The prices ( *1Ap , 
*
1Bp ) and (
*
2Ap ,
*
2Bp ) are the only candidates for a pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium. The former outcome results from both firms adopting independent pricing, 
while the latter outcome results from both firms adopting bundling pricing. 
 
An example of non-existence of pure-Strategy Nash equilibrium8  
 
Even though firm B’s optimal price is everywhere continuous in pA, the existence of a 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium cannot be guaranteed because firm A’s optimal price is not 
continuous at Bp% . The following simple example provides an illustration.   
Assume that the production costs cA and cB are zero, q=1, and θ is uniformly distributed 
between zero and one. From Corollary 1 we need to consider only ( *1Ap , 
*
1Bp ) and (
*
2Ap ,
*
2Bp ) as 
candidates for a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
We first verify whether ( *1Ap , 
*
1Bp ), resulting from independent pricing, is a Nash 
equilibrium. A necessary condition for these prices to be a Nash equilibrium is that the two firms 
face demand system (1). Given this demand system and zero production costs, firm A maximizes 
(1- Apz )pA, and firm B maximizes (1- 1
Bp
z− )pB. Firm A’s first-order condition is given by  
 
(1- Apz )-
Ap
z  = 0,       (3) 
 
                                                          
8 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for providing this example and the intuition 
behind it. 
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and firm B’s first-order condition is given by  
 
(1- 1
Bp
z− ) 1
Bp
z−  = 0                  (4) 
 
The solution of the two first-order conditions (3) and (4) is given by ( *1Ap = 2z , 
*
1Bp = 12z− ), which 
yields θA =θB = 12 , implying that both firms target the same marginal consumer. But the 
discussion leading to Corollary 1 shows that θA =θB cannot be a Nash equilibrium because firm A 
has an incentive to deviate from θA = θB.  A non-technical explanation is as follows. 
The first-order condition (3) says that if firm A decreases (increases) its price by d, its 
consumers increase (decrease) by dz .  However, when firm A increases its price, the impact of 
this price change on firm A’s profit is different from that captured by the first order condition 
(3).9  If firm A does increase its price by d, then θA > θB, and its marginal consumer is determined 
by θA+B. Thus its consumers decrease by d, which is less than dz  as indicated by (3). That is, when 
pA goes up, fewer customers walk away from product A than as indicated by (3) because some of 
those who decide not to buy A alone may buy the bundle (A+B) instead. Since the decrease in the 
sale of product A due to an increase in  pA is less than that indicated by the first-order condition 
(3), independent pricing cannot be a Nash equilibrium. As Lemma 2 indicates, it is firm A that 
wants to deviate from θA=θB. 
With regard to the outcome ( *1Ap , 
*
1Bp ), firm B’s first-order condition (4) implies that its 
consumers increase by d/(1-z) if firm B decreases its price by d. It is not profitable for firm B to 
decrease its price from *1Bp  when it could attract d/(1-z) additional customers by lowering its 
price by d. Starting from θA =θB , if firm B  lowers its price by d, then θA >θB and its marginal 
consumer is determined by θA+B,  implying that it will only gain d customers. Thus, attracting even 
                                                          
9 If firm A decreases its price, the impact on its profit is the same as indicated by (3): if firm A 
does decrease its price by d, then we have θA < θB, and its marginal consumer is determined by 
θA . Thus its consumers increase by dz , as  indicated by (3). 
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fewer customers by lowering its price makes it strictly unprofitable. Thus, firm B’s optimal price 
is *1Bp = 12z−  if firm A sets 
*
1Ap = 2z .
10 
Second, let us check whether bundling pricing ( * 2Ap ,
*
2Bp ) is a Nash equilibrium. A 
necessary condition for these prices to be a Nash equilibrium is that the two firms face demand 
system (2). At the candidate Nash equilibrium ( * 2Ap = 13 ,
*
2Bp = 13 ), each firm earns 19 . Since 
product A provides quality level z by itself, firm A can always sell its product at least half of the 
consumers by setting pA equal to 2
z , yielding a profit of 4
z . Thus, if z is larger than 49 ,  then the 
symmetric price vector ( * 2Ap = 13 ,
*
2Bp = 13 ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium because firm A can do 
better by switching to independent pricing ( pA = 2
z ). In contrast, for z ≤ 49  , firm A does not have 
any incentive to deviate from bundling pricing to independent pricing. Since firm B does not have 
any incentive to deviate from * 2Bp = 13  given 
*
2Ap = 13 ,
11 the symmetric price vector 
( * 2Ap = 13 ,
*
2Bp = 13 ) is a Nash equilibrium if z ≤ 49 .  
In summary, if  z ≤ 49 , then (
*
2Ap = 13 ,
*
2Bp = 13 ) is a Nash equilibrium, which is identical to 
that for the case z= 0, the case of strict complements. There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
if 49 <z <1.
12  
In this example the independent pricing cannot be a Nash equilibrium when the two firms 
target the same marginal consumer. The intuition is extendable to the general cases with positive 
cA and cB and general distribution function F(θ). Under the independent pricing, firm A 
maximizes zF(θA)(θA- Acz ), and firm B maximizes (q-z)F(θB) (θB- Bcq z− ), respectively. The firms’ 
optimal cut-off points θA and θB depend on Acz  and Bcq z− , respectively. When Acz  = Bcq z− , 
independent pricing yields θA =θB, which cannot be a Nash equilibrium. The reason is the same: 
if firm A’s marginal customer is already buying B, then a price increase by firm A will not lead to 
as large a loss in customers as would be the case if firm A were acting without product B. This 
                                                          
10 Starting from θA =θB , if firm B raises its price by d, then θA <θB and it will lose d/(1-z) 
customers as indicated by (4) 
11 With regard to the outcome ( * 2Ap ,
*
2Bp ), a general proof of Proposition 1 shows that it is 
optimal for firm B to set its price at * 2Bp  if firm A chooses
*
2Ap . 
12 If z=1, there is a Nash equilibrium in which firm B sets its price at zero, and firm A behaves as 
a single monopolist. 
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gives firm A an incentive to raise its price, thus destroying independent pricing as a pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium. By continuity, the same argument goes through if Acz  is sufficiently close to 
Bc
q z−  (or equivalently, if firm A’s market share is sufficiently close to firm B’s market share).  
 
General cases 
 In this section we characterize pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the general cases of our 
model. We will show that such equilibria exist if z is either sufficiently small or if z is sufficiently 
large. However, there is an intermediate range of z within which no pure strategy equilibrium 
exists, even though a mixed strategy equilibrium exists.  
To understand intuitively the general non-existence result, we apply the logic used in the 
above example. Consider one of the Nash equilibrium candidates under bundling pricing, ( * 2Ap  
and * 2Bp ). In this case firm A earns Π*A2, which are independent of z. If firm A chooses to deviate 
from bundling pricing by setting its price at *1Ap , it earns at least Π*A1 = F(
*
1Ap
z )(
*
1Ap -cA) , which 
is monotonically increasing in z. Since Π*A2 is independent of z, there exists a unique zmin such 
that Π*A1 > Π*A2 if and only if z>zmin Thus, if z > zmin, then firm A will choose independent pricing, 
implying that ( * 2Ap  and
*
2Bp ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium; if z ≤zmin, then firm A would not 
deviate from bundled sales, and ( * 2Ap  and
*
2Bp ) becomes a Nash equilibrium. 
Similarly, consider the other Nash equilibrium candidate under independent pricing, ( *1Ap  
and *1Bp ), in which case firm A makes Π*A1. However, if firm A switches to bundling pricing, its 
optimal price is RA( *1Bp ), and its resultant profit is  
*
2T (z) = F(
* *
1 1( )A B BR p p
q
+ ) (RA( *1Bp )-cA). Let T(z) 
be defined as T(z)= Π*A1(z) - *2T (z), which is continuous in z. It can be shown that T(z)>0 if z is 
sufficiently large and that T(z)<0 if z is sufficiently small, which implies that, if z is large enough, 
independent pricing is a Nash equilibrium and that, if z is sufficiently small, independent pricing 
cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Since T(z) is continuous in z, there is at least one z such that T(z)=0.  
Let the largest solution of T(z) ＝ 0 be denoted by zmax . It follows that T(z) >0 if zmax <z. That is, 
for z≥ zmax, ( *1Ap  and
*
1Bp ) is a Nash equilibrium.  
The only question left is what happens between zmin and zmax. If T(z) ＝ 0 has multiple 
(always an odd number of ) solutions, then there are alternating sub-intervals over which T(z) > 0 
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and sub-intervals over which T(z)<0. For instance, consider the case of three solutions.13 Let the 
three solutions be given by z1, z2 and zmax. Then, as figure 4 shows, T(z)<0 for z < z1; T(z)>0 for z1 
< z < z2; T(z) < 0 for z2 < z < zmax, and T(z) > 0 for z >  zmax.  It implies that for zmin<  z  < z1 there 
is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; for z1 < z  < z2, independent pricing is a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium; for  z2 <   z< zmax there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium; for z > zmax,  
independent pricing is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.  
If T(z) ＝ 0 has only one solution, then the unique solution is zmax, and T(z)<0 for the 
interval ( zmin , zmax), indicating that a pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist over the entire 
interval. A sufficient condition for the uniqueness is that T(z) monotonically increases in z. Since 
T(z)= Π*A1(z) - *2T (z), by the envelop theorem, we have ( )T zz∂ ∂ =
* * *
1 2 1
*
1
A A B
B
p
z zp
∂Π ∂Π ∂
∂ ∂∂− . If the direct effect 
of z on  Π*A1 is larger than the effect of z on Π*A2 through *1Bp , then T(z) is monotonically 
increasing in z and T(z)=0 has a unique solution.14  
For those intervals over which no pure-strategy equilibrium exists, we can construct a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium. The following proposition characterizes Nash equilibrium for 
different values of z.  
 
Proposition 1: There exist two unique critical values of z: zmin, zmax, with 0 < zmin< zmax ≤ q-cB 
such that the following holds: 
(a) If z ≤  zmin, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with bundling pricing. 
The outcome is identical to the equilibrium for strict complements, i.e., z=0, as products 
A and B are always consumed as a bundle (A+B).  
(b) If  z ≥ zmax, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium with independent 
pricing. Some consumers buy A alone while other consumers buy (A+B).   
(c) If T(z) = 0 has only one solution, then no pure-strategy equilibrium exists over the entire 
interval (zmin , zmax). If T(z)=0 has multiple solutions, then over (zmin , zmax), there exist 
alternating sub-intervals such that over some intervals there exists a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium with independent pricing, and over the remaining intervals no pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium exists.  
(d) When there is no pure-strategy equilibrium, we can construct a mixed-strategy 
equilibrium. The mixed-strategy equilibrium is characterized by a quadruplet  [α, *1Ap , 
                                                          
13 The arguments can be generalized to any odd number of solutions. 
14 Notice that monotonicity is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for uniqueness. This 
condition is satisfied for uniform distribution F(θ). 
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RA( Bp% ), Bp% ], where firm B sets its price at Bp% , α is the probability of  firm A’s 
adopting *1Ap , and (1- α) is the probability of firm A’s adopting  RA( Bp% ) .  
 
Proof.  See the Appendix. 
  
Proposition 1 says that if z is small, then bundling pricing is a Nash Equilibrium. After z 
increases beyond a certain point, firm A would rather set its price to sell product A alone without 
consideration of product B. This independent pricing by firm A, however, cannot be part of a 
pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium, if Firm B targets at roughly the same set of consumers. The 
converse of this result is that independent pricing can be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium only if 
firm A’s market share is much larger than that of firm B.15 As an example, suppose that q=1, z=0.7, 
cB = 0.1 and cA = 0. Independent pricing leads to θA = 0.5, and θB = 0.67, in which firm A’s 
market share is much larger than that of firm B.  These prices constitute a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium because firm A will lose customers rapidly if it raises its price above *1Ap . No 
customers will continue to buy A as part of (A+B) if they decide not to buy A alone, unless the 
price is raised all the way to the point at which θA becomes equal to θB.  
The existence and non-existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium are illustrated in 
Figures 5. If z > zmax, as illustrated in Figure 5-(a), in equilibrium the firms adopt independent 
pricing; if z < zmin, as illustrated in Figure 5-(c), in equilibrium the firms adopt bundling pricing. 
The nature of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 5-(b).  If firm B sets its 
price at Bp% , as Lemma 2 shows, firm A is indifferent between *1Ap  and RA( Bp% ) and is therefore 
indifferent between any randomization of them. There exist probabilities α for *1Ap  and (1-α) for 
RA( Bp% ) such that firm B’s best response to firm A’s randomization is exactly Bp% .  
If there is only one type of consumer, firm A, by virtue of the fact that product A is 
essential to the enjoyment of product B, could extract some of the additional value created by 
product B via aggressive pricing, i.e., firm A sets a higher price for its product than in the absence 
                                                          
15 Under independent pricing, firm A’s market share (resp. firm B’s market share) depend on Acz  
(resp. Bcq z− ). Thus, it happens when z is much larger than AA B
qc
c c+ . 
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of product B, taking out some values created by firm B.16 Proposition 1, however, raises questions 
about the validity of this idea. Part (b) says that over some range of z there is no pure -strategy 
Nash equilibrium. And when such an equilibrium exists, part (c) says that if the extent of the 
quality enhancement, (q-z), is small, then product B does not affect firm A’s pricing and profits. 
 
4. The impact of z on firm profits, consumer surplus, and 
social welfare  
 
Quite often a dominant firm in one layer extends its product boundary to include 
functions that are traditionally provided by its complementors. In this section, we analyse the 
impact of z on the firms’ prices and profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare for the two 
basic cases identified in Proposition 1 (namely, bundling pricing and independent pricing). In the 
analysis, we assume that cA does not change with z, which is a good approximation for the 
software industry.17 If cA  is allowed to increase with z, our main comparative statics results in the 
independent pricing case still hold so long as )( zc
z
A
 is increasing in z, i.e., the production cost per 
unit of z is a decreasing function of z.18  
 
Virtually strict complements under bundling pricing 
 
                                                          
16 When there is only a single consumer type, the existence of product B will lead to a higher 
price for product A. As an example, suppose the consumer values product A at 100 and (A+B) at 
110. Then any price (pA= x, pB =110-x) is a Nash equilibrium as long as 110≥  x ≥100. In Carlton 
and Waldman (2002), for instance, the surplus created by the complementary good is assumed to 
be equally divided between the entrant and the incumbent firm.  
17 For instance, even though Microsoft expands the functions of Windows by incurring R&D 
costs, the marginal production cost of a copy of the Windows would remain roughly the same as 
before.  
18 In the case of virtually strict complements, the results are different from those reported in 
Proposition 2. See the next footnote 
Product Boundary 
 16
If z is small, in equilibrium the firms adopt bundling pricing, and consumers buy only the 
bundle (A+B). The firms’ equilibrium prices are identical to those when z = 0,19 and there is a 
double mark-up problem. Thus, we have  
 
Proposition 2: If  z ∈ [0, zmin), then the equilibrium prices are the same as those for z = 0. 
Consumers always buy A and B as a bundle, and the double mark-up problem persists.  The 
firms’ profits, consumer surplus and social welfare are independent of z.  
 
Virtually independent products under independent pricing 
 
Intuitively, one expects that more consumers buy A and fewer consumers buy B as A’s 
own performance z improves.  That is indeed the case when A and B are virtually independent, i.e. 
z  ≥  zmax.  
Under independent pricing, firm A maximizes ΠA = F(θA)(pA-cA) = zF(θA)(θA- zcA ) by 
choosing *Aθ . Firm A’s optimal cut-off point *Aθ  is an increasing function of zcA , which implies 
that as z increases more consumers buy product A. Similarly, firm B choose *Bθ  to maximize ΠB 
= F(θB)(pB-cB) = (q-z)F(θB)(θB- zqcB− ). Firm B’s optimal cut-off θB* is an increasing function of 
z
cB
−1 , which implies that as z increases fewer consumers buy product B.  
To better understand the classical double mark-up problem for the case of independent 
pricing, we need to characterize the optimal pricing strategies of an integrated monopoly that sells 
both products A and B. It maximizes ΠInt as defined in (5) by choosing two optimal cut-off points, 
xA and xB, where types higher than xA buy product A, and types higher than xB buy product B 
additionally. Since consumers will not buy B without buying A, the firm’s choice variables are 
subject to the constraint xA ≤ xB. 
 
ΠInt = F(xA)(pA-cA) + F(xB)(pB -cB) 
= zF(xA)(xA- z
cA ) + (q-z)F(xB)( xB - zq
cB
− )     (5) 
                                                          
19 Under bundled pricing, if cA increases in z, then z affects the firms’ prices only through cA. 
Thus, the effects of increasing z are the same as those of increasing cA. That is, as z increases, *Ap  
goes up but *Bp , social welfare as well as the two firms’ profits go down.  
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Obviously, the profit function ΠInt is equal to the sum of ΠA and ΠB. In the absence of the 
constraint xA ≤ xB, these two parts of (5) can be maximized independently. 
If z
cA  ≤ zq
cB
− , or equivalently if z ≥ BA Acc
cq
+ , then independent maximization leads to xB*≥  
xA* , i.e., the constraint is automatically satisfied, and the integrated firm can ignore the 
constraint.  In contrast, if z
cA > zq
cB
− , or equivalently if z < BA
A
cc
qc
+ , then the constraint becomes 
binding, implying that the integrated firm will set xB*= xA* .  That is, if z ≥
BA
A
cc
cq
+ , the integrated 
firm sells the two products as if the two products are independent of each other, and if z < 
BA
A
cc
qc
+ , 
the firm sells the two products as if they are strict complements. 
Since zmax> 
BA
A
cc
cq
+ , if  z ≥ zmax, then the two firms A and B behave independently, and the 
prices set by firms A and B are equal to those set by the integrated monopoly. That is, the double 
mark-up problem disappears completely. Also, since the integrated firm’s profit increases in z, the 
industry profits (the sum of the two firms’ profits) increase in z.  
Let us investigate the effect of an increase in z on the consumer surplus. In the case of 
virtually independent products, as z increases, θB increases but θA decreases. The latter implies 
that some new consumers buy product A, which adds to total consumer surplus. The former 
implies that some consumers switch from buying the bundle (A+B) to buying product A alone.  
If θ  is uniformly distributed, then in equilibrium the total price ( *1Ap + *1Bp ) is 2 BA
ccq ++
,  
which does not change with z. Given that the price of the bundle is unaffected  by z, by revealed 
preference consumers who switch from the bundle to product A alone are better off, whereas 
consumers who stay with the bundle are neither better off nor worse off. Thus, considering the 
impact on new consumers who buy A alone, consumers who continue to buy the bundle, and 
consumers who switch from the bundle to A alone, aggregate consumer surplus is definitely 
larger when z increases.                   
 
Proposition 3: Suppose the products are virtually independent as firms adopt independent pricing 
( z ≥ zmax). Then, when cA and cB are positive , as z increases:   
(a) *1Ap  increases and 
*
1Bp  decreases; 
(b) more consumers buy product A, and fewer consumers buy product B; 
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(c) firm A’s profits increase, firm B’s profits decrease, and the industry profits (the sum of the 
two firms’ profits) increase. Also, there is no double mark-up problem. 
(d) When θ is uniformly distributed, the total consumer surplus as well as the industry profits 
increase. 
 
However, for a general distribution, G(θ), it is not clear how ( *1Ap + *1Bp ) changes with z. 
If the total price goes up, then those consumers who buy the bundle both before and after z 
increases will lose. To ascertain such a possibility, let us consider the following example in which, 
as z increases from some given value, not only the aggregate consumer surplus, but also social 
welfare decline. Suppose the distribution function of θ is given by G(θ)= θ2, one that satisfies the 
standard increasing hazard rate condition. Suppose further that q=1, cA=0.2 and cB=0.3. It can be 
verified that zmin=0.41 and zmzx=0.45, so at z= 0.5 there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium 
under independent pricing. It can be shown that (i) ( ) 0A Bp pz
∂ +
∂ > and (ii) 0S Wz∂ ∂ < at z 
=0.5. Since the industry profits increase with z for all z, the latter result implies that aggregate 
consumer surplus must have decreased as z increases from z=0.5. 
 
Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium 
 
In this section, we examine the properties of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium 
identified in Proposition 1, [α, *1Ap , RA( Bp% ), Bp% ] for z between zmin and zmax.   
From the definition of a mixed-strategy, given Bp%  firm A is indifferent between  *1Ap  and 
RA( Bp% ), i.e., ΠA1( *1Ap ) = ΠA2 (RA( Bp% )). From Proposition 3, we already know that *1Ap  is an 
increasing function of z.  Since firm A is indifferent between the two prices, its expected profit is 
equal to ΠA1, which increases with z. Thus, firm A’s expected profit increases in z. Also, from the 
definition of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, when z increases, ΠA2 must also increase, 
which can occur only if Bp%   decreases. Since RA(pB) is a decreasing function of  pB, its follows 
that RA( Bp~ ) increases in z. Because as z increases, both
*
1Ap  and RA( Bp% ) increase, implying that 
the expected price of product A is an increasing function of z. To sum up, we have  
 
Proposition 4: In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, as z increases, the expected price of 
product A go up, the price of product B goes down, and firm A’s expected profits go up.  
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The α in the mixed strategy is chosen so that firm B’s optimal price to the randomization 
becomes Bp% . Unfortunately, we are not able to show how firm B’s profit and α change with z 
generally. 
5.   Extensions to two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity  
 
In the basic model studied in Sections 2-4, a consumer of type θ derives satisfaction zθ 
from product A and qθ from (A+B), respectively, which implies that consumers’ preferences 
toward these two products are perfectly correlated. As Figures 1 and 2 show, each firm’s 
marginal consumer is uniquely determined either only by its own price or only by the sum of 
prices. As a result, each firm sets its price as if the two products were either independent or strict 
complements.20  Under these conditions, we show that firm A’s best response function is not 
continuous when firm A’s optimal pricing scheme changes from bundling pricing to independent 
pricing, and therefore for some intermediate values z there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
To check the robustness of the results obtained in the previous sections, we now consider 
a more general demand specification. Suppose that consumers derive UA (θ, v) = v+ zθ  from the 
main product A and derive UA+B (θ, v) = v + qθ from the bundle (A+B). An interpretation is that 
product A provides two functions, and product B enhances the quality of A’s second function 
from z to q. To make this new preference genuinely different from that of the basic model, we 
assume that consumer preferences vary along v as well as θ.21  In the remainder of this section, 
we assume (θ, v) to be distributed over [0, 1] x [0, v ].22 The vertical axis measures v, the 
consumers’ valuation of the first function of product A, and the horizontal axis measures θ as 
before. A necessary condition for a consumer to buy product A alone is VA(θ, v) = UA (θ, v) - pA ≥ 
0. Similarly, a necessary condition for a consumer to buy (A+B) is VA+B (θ, v) = UA+B - pA - pB ≥ 0. 
                                                          
20 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for providing us with this insight and for making 
several useful suggestions about the analysis of more general preferences. 
21 If v is a constant for all consumers, then VA(θ) = zθ-(pA- v) and VA+B (θ) =qθ-(pA-v+pB), and the 
analysis in Sections 2-4 applies to this new demand specification if pA is replaced by (pA-v). All of 
the earlier results remain intact.  
22 The distribution of v between [0, v ] can be interpreted as if the quality level of the first  
function is v , and the consumers’ valuation of the quality is distributed over [0, 1]. 
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Finally, a necessary condition for a consumer to buy the bundle (A+B) rather than A alone is θ ≥ 
θB= pB/(q-z). 
 
Demand functions for products A and B 
For simplicity, we set q=1. As shown in Figures 6, the nature of the demand functions for 
A and B depends on whether the critical value of the intersection of VA and VA+B  occurs above, 
below, or within [0, v ].23  
If vpp Bz
z
A >− − )( 1 , the situation is as depicted in Figure 6 (a).24 Consumers above VA+B 
will buy the bundle (A+B). The demand for either product depends on the total price (pA+pB), so 
the two firms behave as if the two products are strict complements.  In this case the value of z 
does not affect the firms’ pricing and profits.  
If 0)( 1 <− − BzzA pp , the situation is as depicted in Figure 6 (b).25 Consumers above VA 
buy product A, and consumers to the right of θB buy the bundle (A+B). Demand for the two 
products becomes independent: the demand for B (the dark area) depends only on pB, and the 
demand for A (light area + dark area) depends on pA alone.  Thus, in this case each product’s 
demand depends only on its own price, and there is no double mark-up problem.   
If v ≥ )( 1 Bz
z
A pp −− ≥0, then the situation is as depicted in Figure 6 (c).  Demand for B is 
given by the dark area, whereas demand for A is given by both the light and dark areas.  In this 
case, the demand for product B is a function of (pA+pB) as well as pB, and the demand for product 
A depends on (pA+pB) as well as pA. In Sections 2-4 where consumers differ only in θ, each firm’s 
marginal consumer is uniquely determined by either its own price alone or by (pA+pB ) alone. 
However, in the two-dimensional case, this simple dichotomy is lost, because each firm may have 
a continuum of marginal consumers, which depends on both its own price and the total price. 
Therefore, we refer to the situation depicted in Figure 6(c) as an intermediate case of “mixed 
demand.”  
                                                          
23 The intersection of VA and VA+B occurs at (pB/(1-z),  pA- zz−1 pB). Thus, depending on whether 
(pA- z
z
−1 pB) is larger than or less than 0 and v , the intersection of VA and VA+B  occurs above, 
below, or within [0, v ]. 
24 The inequality  implies that pA> v . 
25 The inequality implies that z
p
z
p BA
−< 1 . Also, since zpB−1  is less than 1, it implies that zp A <1. 
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Nash equilibrium under uniform distribution 
Let us check the existence of Nash equilibrium numerically under the assumption that θ 
and v are distributed independently and uniformly over [0, 1] x [0, v ].  
In the previous one-dimensional case, firm A’s optimal price is discontinuous in pB when 
firm A’s optimal pricing regime switches from independent pricing to bundling pricing. But in 
the two-dimensional case, if v  is large enough, then there are enough consumers who are willing 
to buy product A alone. Thus, bundling pricing is not firm A’s optimal pricing scheme even for a 
case in which z is low.  
For instance, if v =1 and cA =cB=0, then for any price pB between zero and one,26 
bundling pricing cannot be firm A’s optimal price for all values of z.: In this case, when z = 0, 
firm A’s optimal price results in the mixed demand, and firm A’s optimal price is continuous in 
pB. Also, when z= 0.7, if pB is high, firm A’s optimal price results in independent pricing, and if 
pB gets lower, firm A switches to the mixed demand regime, and firm A’s optimal price is 
continuous in pB when it switches from the independent pricing regime to the mixed demand 
regime.27 As a result, firm A’s optimal price is continuous in pB, and a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium exists for all values of z.  
However, if v is small enough, then firm A’s optimal pricing scheme would be bundling 
pricing for some values of z, and there is discontinuity in firm A’s best response to pB when firm 
A switches from bundled sales to the mixed demand. Thus, for some values of z, there is no pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium, which is similar to the results in Proposition 1. An example is z= 0.4, 
v =0.12 and cA =cB=0. The intuition is as follows: If v = 0, then the two-dimensional case is 
reduced to the one-dimensional model, where the non-existence of pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium has been established. If v  is small, then there are not enough consumers who buy 
product A alone. Thus, for a small value of z, bundling pricing becomes attractive to firm A. In 
other words, small v and z may combine to make firm A’s best response function discontinuous, 
the root reason for the non-existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.  
 
Nash equilibrium when v and θ are positively correlated 
                                                          
26 If firm B sets its price above one, it cannot make any positive sales.  
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 Since in reality consumers with high v tend to have high θ, let us study two cases in 
which θ and v are positively correlated.  
(1)  If θ and v are linearly related, say, v = sθ, then, the two-dimensional model is structurally 
identical to our basic model because VA (θ,v) = z~ θ-pA and VA+B(θ,v) = q~ θ- pA -pB , where z~ = z+s 
and q~ = q+s. The results obtained from our basic model in Sections 2-4 apply directly to this 
case. 
(2) Suppose that v = sθ + ε, where ε is uniformly distributed between [0, ε ]. Then VA(θ,v) 
=(z+s)θ-pA+ ε, and VA+B(θ,v)=(q+s) θ-pA-pB+ ε, or  equivalently VA(θ) = ε+ z~ θ-pA, and 
VA+B(θ)=ε+ q~ θ-pA-pB , where z~ = z+s and q~ = q+s. It is equivalent to the two-dimensional case 
analysed above in this section, so we can apply our earlier results to obtain the following: If  the 
dispersion of consumer types as captured by ε  is small, then we might not have a pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium; if  ε  is large, then a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.   
6.  Conclusions 
A dominant firm in one layer of a multi-layered system often seeks to extend the 
functions of its products to include functions that are traditionally covered by firms in other layers.  
The definition of product boundaries changes continuously as a consequence of vertical 
competition. In this paper ,we solve for the equilibrium prices and profits of firms A and B for 
different boundary values z. We have found that if z is low, then the main product A and its 
enhancer B are always sold as a bundle; if z is sufficiently high, then the two firms behave as if 
the two products are independent of each other, and the double mark-up problem disappears; over 
a certain range of intermediate values of z, no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists.    
When the simple model is extended from one dimension to two dimensions of  consumer 
heterogeneity, the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibrium survives either if the variation in 
consumer preferences along the basic function v is small, or if the consumers’ preferences along 
both functions (as captured by v and θ) are sufficiently positively correlated. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
27 Under the parameter values, if pB is higher than 0.294, firm A’s optimal pricing results in 
independent pricing; if pB is lower than 0.294, firm A’s optimal pricing gives rise to the mixed 
demand regime. 
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Appendix 
The appendix collects the proofs that were omitted from the text. 
 
The increasing hazard rate condition yields strictly quasi-concave profit functions. 
Consider a monopolist supplying a product of quality level z.  Without any loss of 
generality, assume that the marginal cost of the product is zero.  Let p denote the price of the 
product and θ denote the firm’s cutoff point i.e., the lowest consumer type buying the product.  
By definition, θ = p/z.  Since there is a one-to-one mapping between p and θ, the firm maximizes 
zθF(θ) by choosing its optimal cutoff point θ.  The first-order condition of profit maximization is 
given by zF(θ)+zθf(θ) = 0.  The second derivative of the profit function is 2zf(θ)+zθf’(θ), which 
upon substitution of  the first-order condition becomes 2zf(θ)-zF(θ)f’(θ)/f(θ). 
The increasing hazard rate condition (i.e., -f/F is increasing) implies (f(θ))2-F(θ)(f’(θ))>0, 
which in turn implies 2zf(θ)-zF(θ)f’(θ)/f(θ)<0 because f(θ)<0.  That is to say, the profit function 
is locally strictly concave in θ whenever its slope is zero, i.e., the function is strictly quasi-
concave in θ.        Q.E.D    
 
Proof of Lemma 1  
 
Firm B maximizes ΠB1 = F( zqpB− )(pB-cB) subject to pB ≥ Az zq p−  but maximizes ΠB2 = 
F( q
pp BA + ) (pB-cB) subject to pB ≤ Az zq p− .  Under the increasing hazard rate condition, each of 
these two functions is strictly quasi-concave in pB and has a single peak.  Let *1Bp  and RB(pA) 
denote the unconstrained optimal pB for the profit functions, ΠB1(pB) and ΠB2(pB), respectively. 
The first-order conditions of these profit functions are as follows:   
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 1
= F( zq
pB
− ) +f( zq
pB
− ) (pB-cB) zq−
1 =0 
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 2
= F( q
pp BA + ) +f( q
pp BA + ) (pB-cB) q
1 =0 
The two first-order conditions evaluated at the kink pB = Az
zq p−  become 
 
pA +
)(
 ) (
z
z
A
A
p
p
f
F
z= 
zq
z
− cB                             (A1) 
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Ap + )(
 ) (
z
z
A
A
p
p
f
F
zq
qz
− = zq
z
− cB,                                         (A2) 
 
 Since F(θ)/f(θ) is increasing in θ, the left-hand side of (A1) and (A2) is 
monotonically increasing in pA. Thus, given q, z, and cB, there is a unique pA that solves (A1) or 
(A2), respectively.  Denote the unique pA satisfying equations (A1) and (A2) by Ap  and Ap , 
respectively.   
Since the right-hand side of (A1) is positive and f(θ)<0, we know that 
A
p  >0.  Also, 
since z
cq B− >1 and F( z
cq B− ) = 0, we have Ap < q-cB.  Since f(θ) <0 and z < qzq z− , we have 0< 
A
p < Ap < q-cB. 
There are three cases:  
Case1 (pA ≤ Ap ): When evaluated at pB =  Az
zq p− , we have 
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 1
 ≥ 0 and 
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 2
 > 0 because 
f(θ)<0.  Since 
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 1
 ≥ 0, *1Bp  that maximizes ΠB1 does not violate the constraint that Bp  ≥ 
Az
zq p− . However, RB(pA) that maximizes ΠB2 violates the constraint that Bp   ≤ Az zq p− .  
Because ΠB1( Az zq p− ) = ΠB2( Az zq p− ), the overall profit function has a single peak at *1Bp , and 
firm B’s global optimum price is given by *1Bp . 
 
Case 2 ( Ap ≤ pA):  In this case, when evaluated at pB = Az zq p− , we have BBp∂
Π∂ 1
 <0 and
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 2  ≤ 0.  
An argument similar to that for Case 1 establishes that the global optimum price is given by 
RB(pA).  
 
Case 3 (pA <pA < Ap ):  In this case, when evaluated at pB = Az
zq p− , we have 
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 1
 <0 and 
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 2
 >0, 
so the global maximum is achieved at the kink, i.e., *Bp  = Az
zq p− .   
 
When pA= Ap ,from the definition of  Ap , B
B
p∂
Π∂ 1
 = 0 and 
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 2 >0 at the kind point pB 
= Az
zq p− . Thus, the kink is firm B’s optimal price. When pA= Ap , from the definition of  Ap , 
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B
B
p∂
Π∂ 1
 < 0 and 
B
B
p∂
Π∂ 2 =0 at the kind point pB = Az
zq p− . Thus, the kink is firm B’s optimal price. 
Therefore, firm B’s optimal price is continuous in pA.          
          Q. E. D 
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
 
Firm A’s profit function is composed of the two underlying profit functions: ΠA1 = 
F( z
p A )(pA-cA) and  ΠA2 = F( q pp BA + ) (pA-cA).  The kink of product A’s demand curve occurs at pA 
= zq
z
− pB.  Let 
*
1Ap  and RA(pB) be the unconstrained optimal prices corresponding to ΠA1 and ΠA2, 
respectively. 
Evaluating the two first-order conditions of ΠA1 and ΠA2, respectively, at the kink and 
rearranging yields 
 
pB +(q-z)
(  ) 
( )
B
B
p
q z
p
q z
F
f
−
−
= 
q z
z
−
 cA                    (A3) 
pB + q
q z
z
− (  ) 
( )
B
B
p
q z
p
q z
F
f
−
−
=
q z
z
−
cA                                    (A4) 
Since F(θ)/f(θ) is increasing in θ, the left-hand side of (A3) and (A4) is monotonically increasing 
in pB. Thus, there exist unique Bp  and Bp that solve (A3) and (A4), respectively.  Since f(θ) is 
negative and q>z,  we have 0< 
B
p < Bp  and there are three cases: 
Case1 (pB ≤ Bp ): When evaluated at the kink pA = zq
z
− pB, we have 1AAp
∂Π
∂  ≥ 0 and 
2A
Ap
∂Π
∂ > 0. It 
implies that *1Ap  that maximizes ΠA1  is equal to or larger than zq z− pB , while RA(pB) that 
maximizes ΠA2  does not violates the condition pA ≥ zq z− pB .  Because ΠA1( zq z− pB) = ΠA2( zq z− pB), 
firm A’s global optimum is given by the peak of ΠA2 at RA(pB). Also, since 2A
Ap
∂Π
∂ > 0 at the kink, 
RA(pB) is strictly larger than zq
z
− pB, and we have θA> θB. 
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Case 2 ( Bp ≤ pB ) :  Again evaluated at the kink, 1AAp∂Π∂ <0 and 2AAp
∂Π
∂  ≤ 0.  An argument similar to 
that for case 1 establishes that firm A’s globally optimal price is *1Ap . Also, since 1AAp
∂Π
∂ <0 at the 
kink, *1Ap  is strictly less than zq z− pB, and we have θA< θB. 
 
Case 3 (
B
p  < pB < Bp ): When evaluated at the kink, we have 1AAp
∂Π
∂ <0 and 
2A
Ap
∂Π
∂  >0, and the 
overall profit function has two peaks, one at *1Ap   and the other at RA(pB), where 
*
1Ap < zq z− pB 
<RA(pB). We need to compare ΠA1( *1Ap ; z) and ΠA2(RA(pB); pB)  to ascertain firm A’s globally 
optimal price. From case 2, firm A’s global optimization occurs at *1Ap when pB = Bp , which 
indicates ΠA1( *1Ap ; z) >ΠA2(RA(pB); Bp ).  From case 1 firm A’s global optimization occurs at 
RA(pB) when pB = Bp , which indicates ΠA2(RA(pB); Bp ) > ΠA1( *1Ap ; z). Since ΠA2(RA(pB);pB)  is 
continuously decreasing in pB while ΠA1( *1Ap ;z) is independent of pB, there exists a unique Bp%  
strictly between 
B
p  and Bp  such that ΠA1( *1Ap ;z) = ΠA2(RA(pB); Bp% ); for pB < Bp% , ΠA1( *1Ap ;z) < 
ΠA2(RA(pB); pB) ; for pB > Bp% , ΠA1( *1Ap ;z) > ΠA2(RA(pB); pB). 
Combining the above cases yields Lemma 2.               Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1  
 
From Corollary 1, we know that there are only two candidates for a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, ( *1Ap  , 
*
1Bp ) and (
*
2Ap  , 
*
2Bp ).  Without any loss of generality, let us set q =1 in this 
proof.  
(A). Conditions under which ( * 2Ap  , 
*
2Bp ) is a Nash equilibrium:  
Suppose that the two firms set their prices at * 2Ap  and 
*
2Bp ,  respectively. Then, a 
necessary condition for these prices to be a Nash equilibrium is that the two firms face demand 
system (2), or we have to have θB < θA, or equivalently z < * 2* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ . Let us check whether the 
firms have any incentive to deviate from the prices when z < 
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ . 
First, when firm A sets its price at * 2Ap , firm B maximizes ΠB1(pB; z) if  pB  ≥ *1 2z Az p−  and 
ΠB2(pB; pA) if  pB  ≤ *1 2z Az p− . As Lemma 1 shows, firm B’s overall profit function has only one 
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peak. Thus, if * 2Bp  maximizes ΠB2 without violating the constraint pB  ≤ *1 2z Az p− , then it is firm 
B’s globally optimal price. .When z < 
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ , we have 
*
2
1
Bp
z− <
*
2Ap
z . Thus, 
*
2Bp  maximizes ΠB2 
without violating the constraint and, thus, is firm B’s globally optimal price when pA  = * 2Ap . 
Second, given * 2Bp , firm A maximizes ΠA1= F( zpA )(pA-cA) if  pA ≤ 1 zz− * 2Bp  and ΠA2= 
F(pA + * 2Bp )(pA-cA) if pA > 1 zz−
*
2Bp . Let 
*
1S (z) and 
*
2S  denote the maximized value of the 
respective profit functions given the constraints. Since z < 
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ , 
*
2S  is equal to Π*A2= 
F( * 2Ap +
*
2Bp )(
*
2Ap -cA), which does not depends on z. Let S(z) be defined as S(z)= 
*
1S (z)-
*
2S , 
which is continuous and monotonically increasing in z. Let us check the sign of S(z). 
If  z is smaller than cA, S(z) <0 because *1S (z) is zero.   
Let us check the sign of S(
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ ). When z =
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ , we have 
*
2Ap = 1 zz−
*
2Bp . Thus, ΠA2 
is optimized at the kink point, pA= 1
z
z−
*
2Bp . As Lemma 2 implies, when we have
2A
Ap
∂Π
∂  = 0 at the 
kink point, we have A
A
p∂
Π∂ 1
<0 at the kink point. Thus, S(
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ ) >0.  
Since S(z) is continuous and monotonically increasing in z, there exists a unique zmin such 
that S(zmin) =0. Also, since S(
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ )>0, we have zmin < 
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ , which implies that θB < θA for z 
≤ zmin. In summary, for z ≤ zmin the two firms do not deviate from ( * 2Ap  and * 2Bp ), and these 
prices constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
 
(B). Conditions under which ( *1Ap  , 
*
1Bp ) is a Nash equilibrium:  
Suppose the two firms set their prices at *1Ap  and 
*
1Bp ,  respectively. Then, a necessary 
condition for these prices to be a Nash equilibrium is that the two firms face demand system (1). 
That is, under the prices we have to have θB > θA, or equivalently * 11 Bp z− >
*
1Ap
z . Since 
*
1Ap
z  (resp. 
*
1
1
Bp
z− ) 
depends only on Acz  (resp. 1
Bc
z− ), we have 
*
1
1
Bp
z− >
*
1Ap
z  if and only if z > 
A
A B
c
c c+ . Let us check whether 
the firms have any incentive to deviate from ( *1Ap  , 
*
1Bp ) when z > AA B
c
c c+  or equivalently when 
*
1
1
Bp
z− >
*
1Ap
z . 
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First, firm B maximizes ΠB1(pB; z) if  pB  ≥ *1 1z Az p−  and ΠB2(pB; pA) if  pB  ≤ *1 1z Az p− . As 
Lemma 1 shows, firm B’s overall profit function has only one peak. When z > A
A B
c
c c+ , we have 
*
1
1
Bp
z− >
*
1Ap
z , and 
*
1Bp maximizes ΠB1 without violating the constraint. Thus, firm B’s global peak 
occurs at *1Bp , and firm B would not deviate from 
*
1Bp  if pA  =
*
1Ap . 
Second, let us check whether *1Ap  is firm A’s optimal price, given 
*
1Bp . Firm A 
maximizes ΠA1 = F( zpA )(pA-cA) if  pA ≤ 1 zz− *1Bp  and  ΠA2 = F(pA+ *1Bp ) (pA-cA) if  pA  ≥ 1 zz− *1Bp . 
Let *1T (z) and 
*
2T (z) denote the maximized values of the respective profit functions given the 
constraints. Similar to part (A), let T(z) be defined as  T(z)= *1T (z)-
*
2T (z).  Since 
*
1
1
Bp
z− >
*
1Ap
z , 
*
1T (z) 
is equal to Π*A1, which is increasing in z. Since *1Bp  is decreasing in z, *2T (z) is a function of z, 
too. Since both functions are continuous in z, so is T(z). 
If z= A
A B
c
c c+ , then we have 
*
1Ap
z = 
*
1
1
Bp
z− , and ΠA1 is optimized at the kink 1 zz− *1Bp .  According 
to Lemma 2, when 1A
Ap
∂Π
∂  =0 at the kink point, we have 
2A
Ap
∂Π
∂ >0 at the kink point. Thus, given 
*
1Bp , 
firm A’s optimal price is RA( *1Bp ), which implies that when z =  AA B
c
c c+  we have T(z)<0 and that 
firm A wants to deviate from *1Ap . 
To establish the sign of T(z) at z = 1-cB, we check the first-order condition of ΠA2 when 
evaluated at the kink pA = 1
z
z−
*
1Bp . The first-order condition at the kink is 
2A
Ap
∂Π
∂ =F(
*
1Bθ )+f( *1Bθ )(z *1Bθ -cＡ), which when combined with the first-order condition of ΠB1 
evaluated at *1Bp  , becomes –f(
*
1Bθ )((1-z) *1Bθ + cA - 1 Bc z− ). Since f(θ)<0, the sign of the expression 
is equal to that of ((1-z) *1Bθ +cA - 1 Bc z− ), which is monotonically decreasing in z.  When z = (1-cB), 
the sign of the expression is equal to that of [cBθB +cA-1 ], which is negative because cB +cA<1 and 
θB<1. As Lemma 2 shows, when AAp∂
Π∂ 2 <0 at the kink, firm A’s global optimal price is given by 
*
1Ap . Thus, when z = 1-cB, we have T(z) >0 and firm A does not want to deviate from 
*
1Ap . 
Since T( A
A B
c
c c+ ) < 0 , T(1-cB) >0 and T(z) is continuous in z, there exists at least one 
solution to  T(z) = 0. Since T( A
A B
c
c c+ ) < 0, the solutions to T(z)=0 are larger than 
A
A B
c
c c+ . If T(z) has 
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multiple solutions, let zmax denote the largest solution. By definition T(z) > 0 for all z > zmax, 
implying that firm A would not switch from independent pricing to bundling pricing if z > zmax.  
In summary, since zmax > A
A B
c
c c+ , if z ≥ zmax, then we have θB >θA, and the two firms would 
not deviate from ( *1Ap , 
*
1Bp ). That is, these prices constitute a Nash equilibrium. 
 
(C). zmin< zmax  
 From the first-order conditions of * 2Ap  and 
*
2Bp , we have 
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ =
* *
2 2
* *
2 2
* *
2 2
* *
2 2
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
A B
A B
A B
A B
F p p
A f p p
F p p
A B f p p
c
c c
+
+
+
+
−
+ − . Since f(θ)<0, we obtain 
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+ <
A
A B
c
c c+ . But we have already 
shown that zmin < 
*
2
* *
2 2
A
A B
p
p p+  and that all solutions to T(z)=0 are larger than 
A
A B
c
c c+ . Combining the 
inequalities yields zmin< A
A B
c
c c+ < zmax. 
If the solution of T(z) = 0 is unique, then it is equal to zmax, and for all z between zmin and 
zmax, T(z)<0, which indicates that there is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for those values of z.  
However, if there are multiple solutions, since T(z) <0 for small z and T(z) >0 for large z, 
T(z) = 0 has an odd number of solutions, and there are alternating sub-intervals over which T(z) > 
0 and sub-intervals over which T(z)<0. If zmin< z and T(z) >0, then independent pricing is Nash 
equilibrium for the values of z. If zmin< z and T(z) <0, then there is no pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium for the values of z. Nevertheless, a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium can be 
constructed. 
 
(D).  Mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium: 
The firms’ best response curves as depicted below help to demonstrate the construction 
of the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.  Suppose that firm B sets its price at Bp~  such that firm A 
has two optimal prices and is indifferent between *1Ap  and RA( Bp~ ). Suppose that firm A sets its 
price at *1Ap  with probability α and at RA( Bp~ ) with probability (1-α). Let us analyse whether 
firm B’s best response to this mixed strategy would indeed be Bp~ . 
 
The existence and characteristics of the Nash equilibrium depend on where the two points, 
m and n, in Figure A(1) are located in Figure A(2). Let y1 and y2 denote firm B’s best response to 
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*
1Ap   and RA( Bp~ ), respectively. Since '
'1
A
BR
R> , when there is no pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium, point n in Figure 7-(a) must be in area B in Figure 7-(b). It indicates that Bp~ <y2.  
If y1 is higher than or equal to Bp% , then firm A’s best response to y1 is *1Ap , and ( *1Ap , y1) 
becomes a pure-strategy equilibrium, which contradicts the non-existence of  such an equilibrium. 
Thus, point m must be in area C, which indicates that we have y1 < Bp~ .  
Regardless of whether firm A sets its price pA1  or RA( Bp~ ), we can show that in terms of 
firm B’s profit any pB higher than y2 is dominated by y2 and that any pB lower than y1 is dominated 
by y1. Thus, firm B’s optimal price to firm A’s randomization is strictly in between y1 and y2. 
When point n is in area B and point m is in area C, if firm B sets its price pB strictly in 
between y1 and y2, we have z
zq−  pA1 < pB< z
zq−  RA( Bp~ ),  implying that firm B’s profit function is 
given by 
 
ΠB(pB)  = α F( zqpB− )(pB-cB) +(1-α)F( ( )A B BR p pq +% ) (pB-cB) 
 
If α=0, firm B’s optimal price is y2; if α=1, firm B’s optimal price is y1. Since Bp~  is 
between y1 and y2 and firm B’s optimal price is continuous in α, by the mean value theorem there 
exists α such that firm B’s optimal price is equal to Bp~ . This proves that [α, pA1,, pA2, Bp% ] 
constitute a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Part (a):  
Firm A’s optimal price satisfies the following first-order condition:  
*
Ap  = cA - z )f(
 ) (
A
A
θ
θF
 
Since (-
)f(
 ) (
A
A
θ
θF
) is decreasing in θA and θA is decreasing in z, the right-hand side of the above 
condition is increasing in z, i.e., *1Ap (z) is increasing in z for all z ≥ zmax. 
Firm B’s optimal price satisfies the following first-order condition:  
*
Bp  = cB - B
B
( ) ( )
f( )
Fq z θθ−   
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Since (-
)f(
 )(
B
B
θ
θF
) is decreasing in θB and θB is increasing in z, the right-hand side of the above 
condition is decreasing in z. Thus, *1Bp  (z) decreases in z for all z ≥ zmax 
 
Part (b) follows from changes in *Aθ  and *Bθ .   
 
Part (c) :  
As firm A maximizes zF(θA)(θA- zcA ), its profit clearly increases in z for z> zmax. As firm B 
maximizes (q-z)F(θB)(θB- zqcB− ), its profit deceases in z for z >  zmax.   
If z > zmax, the two parts of the industry profits are independent of each other, and by the 
envelope theorem, we obtain z
BA
∂
Π+Π∂ )( = F(xA*)( xA*) - F(xB*)( xB*). Please note that xA* 
maximizes F(xA)(xA - z
cA ), and xB*  maximizes F(xB)(xB - zq
cB
− ).  (Note that F(x)(x)  is revenue for 
a firm maximizing F(x)(x-c)). As a firm’s marginal cost gets lower, its revenue gets higher. That 
is, if  z
cA < zq
cB
− , or equivalently if z> BA
A
cc
qc
+ , then F(xA*)( xA*) > F(xB*)( xB*). Thus, z
BA
∂
Π+Π∂ )(  > 0.   
Q. E. D 
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Figure 3.  Firm B’s best response to pA if θ is uniformly distributed  
 
 
 
Jae Nahm, Figure 3 of 7. 
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Jae Nahm, Figure 4 of 7. 
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Figure 4. The sign of T(z) when T(z)=0 has multiple solutions  
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Jae Nahm, Figure 5 of 7. 
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Figure 5 (a), (b), and (c), Nash equilibrium when θ is uniformly distributed  
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Jae Nahm, Figure 7 of 7. 
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